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Abstract 
Suicide attacks by radical lslamists mainly target and harm their co-religionists. Whether in 
Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan, suicide: bombers arc: increasingly directing their blows against 
Muslims, including non-combatants, they labd apostates, infidels or collaborators with foreign 
powers. 1l1e culprits for this indiscriminate carnage arc primarily radical Sunnis known :J..S 
Jihadi Salafists. How could these Sunni radicals square their Islamic legitimacy with three 
clearly established prohibitions in Islam: Do not kill yourself, do not killing non-combatants, 
and do not kill fellow Muslims? Jihadi Salafists circumvent these commands by redefining the: 
meaning of piety in Islam to frame their co-religionists :J..S apostates and hercrics outside the 
protective umbrella of Islam. They also give primacy to human intentionality in warfurc to 
frame self-immolation :J..S marryrdom, not suicide. Finally, they unearth rulings by medieval 
scholars that permit indiscriminate tactics during warfare to protect the collective interests of 
Muslims. 1l1c case of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and its indiscriminate suicide bombings illustrate these 
justifications. 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
Since the ascendance of radical Islamism in the 1970s, rhe violence of its 
adherents has become progressively more cruel and indiscriminate, especially 
coward their co-religio nists. Consequently, advocates of jihadism have had to 
defend themselves against charges of extremism, terrorism and internecine 
bloodletcing. 1 Ar the heart o f these debates is a central paradox. On the one 
hand, radical Islamisrs must anchor their violence in class ical Islamic rexes 
1 1l1e terms 'radical lslamists,' 'jihadists' and 'Jihadi Salafists' are used interchangeably. These 
terms exclude other lslamists that may also be considered radical, such :J..S the Muslim Brother-
hood movements, as well :J..S Islamic nationalists, such as the Palestinian Hamas and the Leba-
nese Hczbollah. 
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and tradition~ in order to uphold their image as bearers of authentic Islam 
and as followers of divine commandments. On the other hand, rhe classical 
Islamic tradition imposes constraints on many aspects of their violent activ-
ism. One such constraint is chat Muslims should not kill themselves inten-
tionally (suicide).2 Another is that Muslims should nor kill rheir fellow 
Muslims.3 Yer another is that Muslims should not intentionally harm non-
combatants (civilians).4 
Salafist, in particular, are vulnerable to critique because rhey are known for 
rheir strict constructionist reading of the Islamic tradition, especially the 
Quran and the Sunna (sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad). Their 
approach to Islamic jurisprudence is known for its outrigh t antipathy to 
innovation (bicf a), which they equate with impiety (kzifr). The average Salafist 
scholar would hold rhac if there are explicit and unequivocal Quranic verses 
(muhkamnt) or prophetic traditions regarding any matter, the role of a pious 
Muslim is to stricrly apply those verses and traditions. Further interpretation 
or human reasoning is not necessary when che Quran and Sunna have settled 
the issue. 
Given rhe strict constructionist orientation of the Jihadi Salafisr move-
ment, how could their adherents justify suicide attacks in places like Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Pakiscan, Saudi Arabia 
and elsewhere around the Muslim world? Many, if not most, of these attacks 
have either targeted Muslims or were carried ouc in a way char does not take 
the most basic precautions against Muslim collateral damage. Given that the 
Quran and Sunna have explicit and unequivocal verses against suicide, aga inst 
Muslims killing civilians, and against Muslims killing their co-religionists, 
how could Jihadi Salafiscs justify rheir waves of suicide bombings? 
l 111e prohibition against suicide derives from Quranic verses 4:29- 30: 'Nor kill (or destroy) 
yourselves: For verily Allah hath been to you Most Merciful! If any do that in rancor and 
injustice, - soon shall We cast chem imo the Fire: And easy it is fur Allah.' It is also inferred 
from a Prophetic tradition cited in Sahih Muslim and Sahih Bukhari: 'And whoever commits 
suicide with a piece of iron will be punished with the same piece ofiron in the Hell Fire.' 
J Quranic verse 4:93 is the basis for this prohibition: 'If a man kills a believer imemionally, 
his recompense is Hell , to abide therein (For ever): And the wrath and the curse of Allah arc 
upon him, and a dreadful penalty is prepared for him.' 
~ The prohibition against killing non-combarnms derives from Quranic verse 2: 190: 'Fight 
in rhe path of God rhosc whu fight you, but do nor transgress limirs, for God docs nor love 
transgressors.' Ir is also found in a Prophetic tradition quoted in Sahih Muslim: ' Ir is narrated 
on rhc auc11oriry of 'Abdullah elm a woman was found killed in one of the battles fought by 1hc 
Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him). He disapproved of the killing of women and 
children.' 
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Jihadisc liceracure concerning che legitimacy of these accacks has become 
quire diffused. For example, one can find several craccs on chis issue on che 
Tawhid wal jihad web portal associaced wich Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi , 
who is che intellectual father of Jihadi Salafism and che mentor of Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi, che archirecc of the scracegy of suicide terrorism in che Iraqi insur-
gency before he was killed in a U.S. air strike in June 2006. 1his literature 
reveals three lines of argumemarion char have become the basis for Jihadi 
Salafist violence in che Muslim world. First, Jihadi Salafists give much atten-
tion to the meaning of piety and apostasy in Islam. Declaring Muslims to 
be outside the creed is the principal jusrificarion for killing chem in mass-
casualty acracks. Those who are targeted are described as tyrants, apostates, 
heretics and infidels who can be legitimately attacked despite their nominal 
Muslim scacus, as long as these atcacks accrue benefits to the Muslim insur-
gents in a defensive warfare. Second, Jihadi Salafisrs rely on che notion of 
human intentionality co justify behaviour char outwardly appears co violate 
the 'will of God,' including suicide. Actions are judged not on their observ-
able characteristics or consequences, but rather on rhe incention of the acting 
agent. In doing so, chey reframe suicide attacks as martyrdom because che 
incention of che attacker is co sacrifice himself in order to kill others who are 
deemed enemies of Islam, not to commit suicide to escape his condition in 
this world. 1l1ird, Jihadi Salafiscs rely on historical religious rulings concern-
ing che permissibility of killing civilians in a night raid (qatl al-bayat), as well 
as Muslims who are forced to serve as human sh ields (qatl al-turse) for their 
enemies. These exceptions to general rules on indiscriminate violence against 
non-combatants or fellow co-religionists are elevated co che status of rexrual 
proof permitting mass casualty accacks chat harm Muslims. In doing so, vio-
lent Islamisr extremists appear co be anchored in the Islamic tradition. 
1l1e following analysis focuses on rhe case of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and 
its suicide bombings campaign against the Shi'a and indigenous security 
forces in Iraq. Deployment of suicide bombers in Iraq is interesting for four 
reasons. First, in a relatively shore time AQI managed to launch more suicide 
attacks chan established groups, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon; Hamas in rhe 
West Bank, Gaza, and Israel; Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka; and Al-Qaeda world-
wide combined (Hafez, 2007). Second, most of these suicide attacks have 
been carried out against Muslims in Iraq as opposed to the 'crusading' coali-
tion forces led by the Uni red Scates. Third, many of the suicide bombers have 
come from outside Iraq and from as far away as Europe. Finally, rhe cruel 
nature of these attacks has generated an intense debate among radical Isla-
mists over their legitimacy, rhus forcing AQI to justify these attacks in rheo-
logical terms. 
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I 
The Meaning of Piety and Apostasy in Islam 
Jihadi Salafiscs make ic clear chat nor everyone who calls himself a Muslim 
can be considered as such. Islam is nor jusc a mere ucrerance with the tongue 
(iqrar), ir is also sincere belief in rhe heart (11iyah) and manifest deeds ('amal 
al-jawarih). 1l1e three muse be present for a person co truly be a Muslim. 
1hey cite rhe example of Abu Bakr, rhe firsc Caliph in Islam, who foughr wars 
wirh tribes char claimed co be Muslim bur refused co pay rhe alms cax (zakat). 
Abu Bakr judged chem on their deeds, not words. Given chis precedent from 
rhe pious ancestors (al-salaf al-salih), ir is permissible co judge rhe 'so-called 
Muslims' on their deeds, noc cheir words alone.s 
1l1e notion of aposcasy is used co rationalise expansive violence againsc co-
religioniscs. In che case of Iraq, AQI and ocher Jihadi Salafiscs argue chat the 
Quran in verse 5:51 scares: 'O you who believe! Do not rake the Jews and che 
Chriscians for friends; chey are friends of each ocher; and whoever amongst 
you cakes chem for a friend, then surely he is one of chem; surely Allah does 
noc guide che unjust people.' 1l1e Iraqis chac cake che Americans as their 'mas-
cers' are in violation of chis verse. According ro AQI, one of che violacions 
rhac place Muslims outside rhe creed is giving support co unbelievers over 
believers. By siding with che non-Muslims against che Muslim insurgenrs, che 
Iraqi forces have forfe ited their claim co being Muslims and have become 
apostates. 
In Islam, it is permissible for Muslims co kill aposcares for abandoning rhe 
fa ith unless they repent. However, according co AQI, even che opportunity 
for repentance - i.e., giving people a chance co abandon what rhey are doing 
in support of the occupation before killing chem - is nor applicable in Iraq. 
An opportunity for repencance, it argues on the authority of the Hanbali 
scholar Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328), is possible when Muslims are in a posi-
tion of power and control. Absent chis condicion, apostates could be killed 
without giving chem a chance co repenc. Moreover, according co AQI, fighc-
ing against che apostates 'rakes precedence over fighcing against the original 
infidels. Apostasy is a greater transgression rhan original unbelief, and rhe 
apostate is a greacer enemy.'6 
' 1his point was made in two separate traces by Al-Qaeda in Iraq. 1he first is entitled 'll1c 
Creed and Methodology of Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's Jihad Organisation in the Land of the 
Two Rivers' (Arabic). It appeared in the 'Lion's Den' web forum on 21 March 2005. The sec· 
ond is entitled 'Why Do We Fight and Whom Do We Fight?' (Ar.ibic). It was authored by Abu 
Hamza.Ii al-Baghdadi, the senior Islamic advisor to Zarqawi. le appeared in the Islamic Renewal 
Organisation web forum on 10 June 2005. Both were issued by the Islamic legal council of 
Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's Jihad Base in the Land of the Two Rivers. 
" Ibid. 
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As for ochers who are oucside che security services and che governmenc, 
chey are safe as long as they refrain from aiding the regime and the occupa-
tion forces in any way. However, AQI defines supporc for che occupation and 
che existing regime in very broad cerms chat place nearly every Iraqi who is 
nor an insurgent in co che circle of enemies: 
I. 1hose who give aid by 'word of mouth' such as the 'evil Islamic scholars;' 
chief among chem is che Shi'i cleric 'al-Siscani, his followers, his troops, 
and his sympachisers.' 
2. Those who give aid by cheir actions, not just soldiers and police forces, but 
also chose who 'maincain public order in che scare,' chose who 'defend 
conscicucional legitimacy,' and chose who uphold che law by 'carrying our 
che verdicts passed by che tyrannical, man-made courts.' 
3. Anyone who assists che enemy in any way even if 'he might be a Muslim in 
his heart, might have no thoughts in his mind against Islam, and there 
might be no suspicions surrounding him.'7 
Zarqawi juscifies che mass slaughter of Shi'a because many of chem have ca ken 
up che call of joining che Iraqi security forces. In a fifty-minute video mon-
tage dedicated co rhe theme of fighting che Iraqi police and security forces, 
Zarqawi rhetorically asked, 'Why is ic permissible co scrike che enemy when 
he has blonde hair and blue eyes, but it is not permissible ro strike him when 
he has dark hair and black eyes?'8 He concluded, 'An American Muslim is our 
beloved brother, and an Arab infidel is our depraved enemy, even if we share 
with him che same spot of land.' 
According ro AQI, co rhe excenr chat most o f che collaboracors come from 
che Shi'i camp, indiscriminate accacks against chem are permissible because, 
unlike 'true' Muslims, rheir blood is not sacrosanct. The Shi'a, Zarqawi 
argued, a re heretics ou cside of che creed because chey rejecc che fi rsc cluee 
7 Ibid. See a similar definition in lhc fonlla by the Islamic legal com mi nee of the Ansar al-
Sunna Army entitled '1l1e Ruling Concerning Jihad in Iraq,' published in the first issue of its 
monthly online journal Amar al-S111111n (Septcmbc-October 2003, Pp. 14-18). 1l1is form of 
expansive rakfir (declaring other Muslims as apostates) is not new. In Algeria and Egypt during 
the 1990s, Jihadi Salafists used these exact same arguments to justify killing Muslim govern-
ment officials, policemen, state workers, intellectuals, rourists, and ordinary civilians (H afez, 
2003). 
• This argument was repeated in anolher montage issued by lhe G lobal Islamic Media Front 
and entitled 'Commander of the Slaughterers.' Zarqawi stated, 'After the American suffered 
major losses, they began to cre;itc the local police and securiry services to do their work. 1l1cy 
have become infidels and apostates for serving the Americans ... Those that say you can kill 
those with blue eyes, but not those with black eyes love nationalism, not monotheism; they 
want this world, not the next. The Iraqi Army is the army of apostasy.' 
: ?~.~·· .. r~-~-r-_~ 
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caliphs of Islam - Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, Omar Ibn al-Khatcab, and Uchman 
bin 'Afan - which are che core of the pious ancestors for Sunni Muslims. 
1hey also question che chastity of 'Aisha, a wife of che Prophet Muhammad, 
despite che fuct char the Quran insists on her pure character. 1he Shi'a also 
hurl invectives ;n Abu Hurayrah, one of che most prolific transmicrers of Pro-
phetic traditions in Sunni Islam. In doing so, rhey call into question che 
foundations of Sunni jurisprudence, which is based in large pare of prophetic 
traditions. Given chat chey are heretics, argued Zarqawi, their blood could be 
shed for che interest of deterring a cracks on che people of rhe Sunna. 
Zarqawi, in effect, engages in collective takfir- the ace of Muslims declar-
ing ocher Muslims ro be infidels, which is analogous to excommunication in 
Catholicism. The logic of generalised takfir was rejected in the past by semi-
nal Jihadi Salafiscs, such as Abu Basir al-Tarrusi.9 The lacrer makes a distinc-
tion between general infidelity (k11.fr al-'aam) and individual infidelity (k11.fr 
al-m1/ayen) in his most comprehensive work on chis issue, Foundations of 
Tak.fir, released in 1994. Al-Tarcusi argues char Muslims have an obligation to 
point our char certain categories of beliefs and behaviours conscicure cardinal 
sins (kufr kabir or al-kabair). For example, accepting Shi'i doctrines is canra-
mounc to heresy; governments that do not apply Islamic law are infidels; and 
Muslims who aid infidels against ocher Muslims are aposta tes. 1herefore, one 
can say, in general, char anyone who holds these beliefs or acts in such manner 
is an apostate and an infidel. 
For T:1rcusi, however, general takjir (k11.fr al-'amn) does nor mean char indi-
viduals char hold these beliefs or ace in such ways could be deemed apostates 
wichouc going ch rough a rigorous due process of verification and clarification 
before punishment is mered our. There are conditions chat preclude a pro-
nouncement of individual apostasy (k11.fr 11w'aym) and requirements char 
muse be mer before such a pronouncement is made. Al-Turcusi lists eight 
conditions char preclude individual charges of takfir even when ic is obvious 
char che actions or beliefs of the individual involved constitute unequivocal 
cardinal sins, generally speaking. These can be summarised as lacking proper 
knowledge of what constitutes cardinal sins in Islam due to lack of mencal 
maturity associated with young age, retardation, or insanity; ignorance, mis-
understanding, and misinterpretation of the proper doctrine, or improper 
socialisation in che fuich; coercion by unbelievers; and dilemmas in which 
believers have to choose between greater and lesser forms of impiety.10 In 
'' Abu Basir al-Tarcusi is also known as Abdul Mun'crn Mustapha Halcrnah. He is a Syrian 
Jihadi Salafisr residing in London. He distributes his radical writings on his websites: hnp:// 
www.abubasccr.com and h ttp://www.abubasecr.bii.land.com/books.htrn. 
111 Al-Tanusi, Fo1111dntiom o/Tnkjir, Pp. 57-72. 
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ocher words, outward appearance of major impiety does nor aucomarically 
translate into permission co engage in takfir, nor co mention accual punitive 
violence againsr che purported culprits; one has ro proceed on a case-by-case 
basis ro show char chose who commie the cardinal sin of aposrasy are doing so 
wichour excenuacing circumstances. 
Assuming rhe conditions chac preclude takjir do noc exist or are imperma-
nent, chose whose duty is co pronounce takfir against specific individuals have 
co fulfil ac lease cwo major requirements. The first requirement is al-tabyin wal 
tathbit, exposing che cardinal sin ro che individual concerned and substanti-
ating che violarion wich definitive cexcual proof from che Quran and Pro-
phetic traditions. Moreover, chose who muse deliver che evidence should be 
credible sources beyond doubt so chat che validity of cheir message is not 
cainced by che unreliability of che messenger. The second requirement is iqa-
mat al-lmja, presenting che evidence direccly co che individual and addressing 
any possible misunderstandings he or she may have regarding che evidence. 
Once chese rwo requiremenrs are met, che legitimacy of takjir against unre-
penranc individuals is assured. Only rhen is ic possible fo r Muslims co kill 
legicimacely rhe aposcare. 
More recencly, che repentant j ihadisc Sayyid Imam al-Sharif raised similar 
objections ro collective takfir. 11 He insists char ic is nor enough ro judge Mus-
lims on che basis of their manifest actions; it is also necessary ro inquire as co 
the intentions behind their actions before declaring chem infidels. Even then, 
rhe culpable person muse be given an o pporcuniry to repent. Finally, adds 
Sayyid Imam, chose char engage in takfir muse balance between che benefits 
and harms of punishing those deemed infidels. Ac rimes, what is permissible 
toward individuals in Islam may be temporarily suspended because of the 
11111fasid (harms) that will accrue to the colleccive. 12 
1he implication of al-Tartusi's and Sayyid Imam's views on collective t11kfir 
is char a general pronouncement of t11kfir (krifr 11!-'1111111) does not give lsla-
miscs license to declare char every individual char violates accepted principles 
of beliefs and conduce is an infidel without first going ch rough the rigorous 
due process of issuing takfir against each and every individual involved (krifr 
11 Sayyid Imam al-Sharif is also known as Abdel Qadir 13in Abdel Aziz and previously wrote 
under the pen name 'Dr. Fad!.' He: has been in an Egyptian prison since 200 1 for his p:1Sr activ-
ities in the Islamic Jihad Organisation. During his militant career, he: produced a number of 
imponant ideological documents in support of jihad against secular Muslim governments. 
However, in 2007, he issued a documenr cnricled 'Guiding Jihadi Action in Egypr and the 
World' (Arabic) in which he revised his earlier views and offered an incisive theological critique 
of contemporary jihadism, especially Al-Qaeda. His documenr was serialised in 15 pans in 
AlmruryA/youm, an Egyptian newspaper, between 18 November and 26 December 2007. 
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nl-mu'ayen). Al-Tartusi's and Sayyid Imam's positions do nor pur an end to 
rhe possibility of Muslim-on-Muslim violence, but they place major obstacles 
in from of chose who wish to carry our mass-desrruccion and mass-casualry 
attacks against Muslims in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Human Intentionality and the lslamic Prohibition against Suicide 
Suicide terrorism involves killing oneself. Yer, suicide is strictly prohibited in 
Islam as noted by traditional Salafisr scholars, such as Sheikh Naser al-Din al-
Albani, Sheikh Ibn 'Urhaimin, Sheikh Abdel Aziz bin Baz and Sheikh Abd 
al-Aziz al-Shaykh.13 
Jihadi Salafim begin by pointing our rhar che Quran recognises and vener-
ates rhe category of rhe martyr in verses 2:207, 3:169, 4:69, 4:74, 4:95-96 
and 9:20-22. TI1e two most cited verses, however, are: 14 
9: 111 - Allah harh purchased of che believers cl1eir persons and their goods; for 
rheirs (in rcrurn) is che garden (of Paradise): rhcy fight in His cause, and slay and arc 
slain: a promise binding on Him in truth ... 
2: 154 - And call nor chose who are slain in rhc way of Allah 'dead.' Nay, chcy arc 
living, only ye perceive noc. 
Moreover, God commands the Muslims to fight the unbelievers with what-
ever capabilities they could muster, including their lives: 
2: 2 16 - Fighting is commanded upon you even chough ir is disagreeable co you. 
Bur it is possible rhar you dislike someching which is good for you and tl131 you love 
something which is bad for you. God knows, bur you know not. 
Given that God commands fighting and recognises and elevates the status of 
martyrs, how does one evaluate the permissibility of suicide operations? The 
major innovation of rhe Jihadi Salafists revolves around the norion of human 
intentionality. As rhey put it, there is a fundamental qualitarive difference 
between the inrenrions of a person committing suicide co kill oneself and one 
•J Al-Albani ruled that this tactic can only be ordered by an agreed upon Islamic commander 
under an Islamic state. Organisations and individuals cannoc call for suicide anacks on their 
own. 111c mhers simply ruled it is a form of suicide prohibited by Islam. 
14 Sec Yahya Hashim Hasan Farghal, 'Uncovering the Intentions behind Martyrdom Opera-
tions' (Arabic) posted on che Tawhid waljihad website (hup:/lwww. tawhed.ws), n.d.; and Abu 
Sa' ad al-'Amili, 'Martyrdom Operations: 111e Highest Form of Martyrdom,' (Arabic) posted on 
the Tawhid wal]ihad website (http:/lwww.cawhed.ws), n.d. 
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committing suicide to kill 'enemies of Islam and Muslims.' The former is a 
depressed person who has given up on life and cannot bear his hopelessness. 
His suicide is about escapism, the deviation of a weak mind. Martyrs, on the 
other hand, are about noble sacrifice by strong-willed individuals. 
1l1e a rgument is best exemplified by Abu Qarada al-Falistini.15 He argues 
char during che time of the Prophet Muhammad, two paradigms presented 
themselves. The first paradigm involved a Muslim killing himself by leaning 
on his sword after suffering an unbearable wound in baccle. Rather than 
endure the pain , he intentionally killed himself to bring relief only to him-
self. When people asked about his destiny, the Prophet Muhammad declared 
rhar he is eternally in hellfire, which is the judgment of any person who com-
mits suicide. 1l1e second paradigm involved what is termed 'plunging into 
the ranks' (a/-inghimas fi al-saj) .16 In this paradigm, Muslims, after hearing 
the Prophet Muhammad cite the rewards of martyrdom, intentionally took 
extraordinary risks in batcle against unbelievers, including single fighters 
rushing headlong into a group of combatants, in order to achieve martyr-
dom.17 In this paradigm, these people are considered devout Muslims who 
will be rewarded abundancly in paradise. 
According co Abu Q arada, what distinguishes the first paradigm from che 
second is che intention of the acting agent. In che first paradigm, che person's 
intention was to escape che pain of this world, while in the second paradigm 
rhe person's intention was to fulfil God's command to fight in His path even 
if it entails one's own death. In boch paradigms che end result is che same, 
which is rhe death of che Muslim fighter, bur che intention of each differed 
significancly. In che case of che fighter 'plunging into the ranks' of che infidels, 
he was sacrificing himself for che benefit of ochers. In the case of the wounded 
fighter, he killed himself co benefi t no-one o cher chan himself. 
Abu Q acada's intentionality claim is anchored in che notion of Muslim 
interests. Plunging into enemy ranks cannot be done for its sake. It muse 
concain a benefi t for Islam and Muslims. Martyrdom, similarly, is never sim-
ply for ics own sake, bur rather for the sake of raising God's word on earch 
1 ~ Abu Qat3da al-Falistini, 'll1c Permissibility of Martyrdom Operations: They Arc Not Sui-
cide,' {Arabic) posted on the Tawhid wnl ji/Jttd website (hup://www.tawhcd.ws), 6 November 
1995. 
1
• Jihadi Salafists rely on a ruling issued by lbn Taymiyyah {1263- 1328), a medieval Hanbali 
scholar, concerning 'The Basis for Plunging into the [Ranks of the] Enemy: Is it Permissible?' 
This ruling was posted on che Tawhid waljihad website {lmp:www.rawhed.ws}, n.d. 
17 For copious citations of Prophetic traditions and stories from the Prophet's companions 
regarding pl unging imo the ranks of the enemies, see the tract by Yousuf al-Ayiri, 'Did Eve 
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and advancing the causes of Muslims. Abu Qarada defines Muslims' interests 
broadly. For instance, it is permissible for a person co take extraordinary risks 
by plunging into enemy ranks if only to show che enemies of Islam char Mus-
lims are courageous and do nor fear death. 1l1is benefits che Muslims because 
the enemy might be deterred from attacking or may even surrender given the 
perceived determination of Muslims. Plunging into the ranks might also ben-
efit Muslims by encouraging other Muslim fighters ro become equally cou-
rageous and follow in the footsteps of the 'martyr.' Under such a broad 
conception of Muslim interests, ir is easy co see how vi rtually any suicide 
attack roday could be considered of benefit to Islam and Muslims. 
le is remarkable co note rhe self-interested and contradictory ways Jihadi 
Salafiscs employ and dismiss the notion of human intencionaliry. In rhe case 
of killing fellow Muslims (discussed above), those deemed 'aposcares' are 
killed regardless of their inrcnsions or reasons for their conduce. The inten-
tions behind their actions are dismissed as irrelevant as long as their manifesc 
conduce appears co be in violation of major Islamic principles. In the case of 
suicide bombings, however, rhe outward appearance of violating major 
Islamic principles against self-immolation is created as secondary co rhe inrcn-
tion of rhe bombers. Jc does not matter that che suicide bomber is killing 
himself, as long as his intention is to raise God's word on earth. 111is shifting 
methodology clearly reflects the tendentious nature of Jihadi Salafisr interpre-
rations of che Islamic tradition. 
The 'Permissibility' of IGlling Civilians in Islam 
Jihadi Salafists and even those who come from the Muslim Brotherhood tra-
dition point co Prophetic traditions and Hanbali rulings char rhey say permirs 
che killing of civilians in the context of warfare. 18 111ese traditions refer co 
launching projectiles from a cacapulc (manjaniq) at enemy positions where 
civilians are presenr and 'che night raid' (qatl al-bayat) found in Sahih Muslim: 
' Jc is reported on the aurhoriry of Sa'b b. Jathchama chat the Prophcr of Allah 
(may peace be upon him), when asked about the women and children of the 
polycheiscs being killed during the night raid, said: "They arc from chem."' 
To rhe Jihadi Salafiscs, chis is proof char che Prophet recognised the need 
for civilian collateral damage in che context of war. 111ey supplement their 
'" Takrouri (2003: 238-244); Sulieman Bin Nasr al-'Alwan, '111c Ruling to Kill Women and 
Children in Marryr<lum Operations,' (Arabic) posted on the Tn111hid 11111lji/111d website (Imp:// 
www.tawhcd.ws), 24 February 1422 (Islamic calendar); Hamid al-'Ali, '1hc Ruling Concerning 
Killing Jewish Women and Children in Palestine,' (Arabic) posted on the Tn111hid 11111/ Jihnd 
website (http://www.tawhcd.ws), n.d. 
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argumenc by citing Quranic verse 16: 126, 'And if you cake your rurn, then 
punish with the like of that with which you were afflicted.' Given that Shi' i 
militias are killing Sunnis in Iraq, they argue, it is permissible for the Sunni 
insurgencs to kill the civilians of the Shi'a in revenge. 19 
However, it is important to note thar other Jihadi Salafisrs, especially Abu 
Basir al-Tarrusi and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, question the appropriate-
ness of applying this tradition in Iraq and elsewhere. Abu Basir, for instance, 
argues chat there are unequivocal (m11hkamat) verses and traditions chat a re 
absolute (qat'iyyah) in rheir command not to intentionally kill civilians. 
1herefore, one should not use verses subject to multiple incerprerations 
(mutnshabihat) or rulings by scholars to override the clear and absolute 
Quranic and Prophetic commands.20 Doing so elevates the rulings of fullible 
scholars over clear commands by infullible divine beings. Similarly, al-Maq-
disi, raises objections about the use of the 'night raid' tradition to justify kill-
ing civilians. He argues that the night raid covers an exception against the 
general rule of avoiding harm to non-combatants. Yet, some of the jihadists 
in Iraq have applied rhis tradition as if it is the rule, not the exception. More 
imporrandy, the tradition concerning the 'night raid' suggests that the Mus-
lim fighters are unable to distinguish ber\'veen enemies and their civil ians 
because the raid is carried our at night. Therefore, the tradition affirms the 
need to avoid civilians to the extent one can distinguish berween combatants 
and civilians. Ir is nor a blanket statemenc to support killing civilians during 
war. Al-Maqdisi concludes that if all chis caution is given to avoiding harm to 
the civilians of rhe unbelievers, imagine how much more caurion fighters 
must rake when it comes ro the possibili ty of killing Muslim civilians.21 
The 'Permissibility' of Killing Muslim Human Shields 
The most complex argument for the permissibility of Muslims killing other 
Muslims is based on a historic ruling of Islamic scholars concerning killing 
human shields (qatf al-time). According ro this tradition, the scholars ruled 
i; The Global Islamic Media Front, affiliated to AQI , begins a shore video entitled '1l1cy Kill 
Our Women and Children so We will Kill Their Women and Children' with this Quranic 
verse. 
:u Abu Basir al-Tarrusi, 'Warnings Concerning Martyrdom or Suicide Operations,' (Arabic) 
posted on the: Tawhid waljihndwcbsitc: (http://www.tawhed.ws), 24 August 2005. 
JI Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 'ReAecrions on the Fruits of Jihad: Bcrwc:cn the Ignorance 
of Islamic Law and the Ignorance of Realiry,' (Arabic) posted on the Tawhid wal Jihad website 
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that it is permissible for Muslims co kill their co-religionists if they are serv-
ing willingly or unwillingly as human shields for invaders. 
AQI has used this ruling co justify Muslims killing other Muslims in pub-
lic spaces. It argues that the occupation forces are hiding behind co-religion-
ists in markets and other public places and that it is nearly impossible for the 
jihadists to fighr the enemy withour inflicting unintentional harm on other 
Muslims. If the attacks, especially suicide bombings, were to stop in Iraq in 
order co save the lives of these innocent Muslims, the struggle would come to 
an end and the unbelievers would triumph . TI1is outcome harms the 'collec-
tive' interests of Muslims by allowing unbelievers co control Muslim lands 
and wealch and inflicc humiliation and suffering on che entirety of the Mus-
lim nation. On che ocher hand, carrying our operations chat kill ordinary 
Muslims results in 'private' harm against individuals, while they bring 'collec-
tive' benefits co the entirety of the Muslim communi ty in Iraq, indeed Mus-
lims around the world.22 TI1is logic, according co AQI, is the essence behind 
che ruling of the pious ancescors concerning killing human shields. 
Jihadi Salafists excend che logic of this argument further to juscify self-sac-
rifice. According co one Jihadi Salafisc scholar, in accordance wich the 'human 
shields' ruling, if it is permissible for Muslims in cercain circumstances co 
inflict harm on other Muslims to benefit the entirety of the Muslim nacion, 
then cercainly it is permissible for Muslims in certain circumstances co inflict 
harm on themselves to benefit Islam. Muslims killing their co-religionists is a 
greater sin than Muslims killing themselves in an act of suicide. While both 
are cardinal sins that warrant eternal damnation in the eyes of God, Muslims 
killing other Muslims involve two types of harms. TI1e first harm is co the 
injured Muslim who did noc wish co be killed, while the second harm is to 
the murdering Muslim who violated God's command. The act of suicide, on 
the other hand, involves a singular harm to che perpetracor of the act. TI1e 
suicidal individual harms himself and no one else. Given this hierarchy of 
sins, if the ruling permitting the killing of Muslim human shields is applica-
ble, then certainly the ruling concerning the lesser sin of committing suicide 
is valid if done to benefit Muslims in the pach of God.23 
11 This claim is made explicitly by al-Zarqawi in his audio recording c:ntidcd 'The Desccnd-
cnrs of lbn al-'Alqami arc Back.' However, his claim is largely derived from other Jihadi Sala fist 
scholars t11at have made this argument long before he did. Sec, for example, Hamoud Bin Aqla 
al-Shu'aybi, 'Ruling Concerning Martyrdom Operations,' (Arabic) posted on rhc Tawhid wal 
jihadwcbsirc (http://www.tawhcd.ws), 2 February 200 1; and Abu Janda! al-Azdi, 'Passages of 
Jurists about die Rules Concerning Raiding and Human Shields (Bombings and Ambushes),' 
(Arabic) posted on the Tawhid wa/}iluidwcbsite (http://www.tawhcd.ws), 20 May 2003. 
!J AJ-Shu'aybi, ibid. 
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Other radical Salafists, however, have taken issue with the applicability of 
the ruling concerning human shields. 1l1ey argue that this rule comes with 
scringent condicions that muse be mec before Muslims are allowed to kill fel-
low Muslims. Abu Basir al-Tartusi points out four conditions that must be 
met before applying che ruling concerning killing Muslim human shields. 
First, it must be impossible co fight the aggressor except through harming the 
human shields. If there are ocher ways to repel the invaders, then it is not 
permissible to harm the human shields or to seek to fight them directly. Sec-
ond, it must be clear that avoiding harm to the human shields results in a 
bigger harm to Muslims. Islamic principles command chat you repel the 
greater harm with the lesser harm if one or the other is unavoidable. 1l1ird, 
the benefit stemming from killing human shields must be absolutely clear 
and undisputable, not a mere possibility or a probabilistic outcome. Finally, 
if the three conditions are met, it is permissible ro attack the enemy being 
shielded by Muslims, bur the intenc muse be to kill the enemy, not the Mus-
lims.24 
Conclusion 
Islamisr suicide bombers in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and else-
where have been striking mainly at co-rel igionists. Consequently, these Jihadi 
Salafists confront a challenge in legitimising their violence in light of three 
clearly established prohibitions in Islam: Do nor kill yourself, do nor kill fe l-
low Muslims, and do not kill civilians. The revulsion roward lslamists killing 
their co-religionists became evident in December 2007, when Dr. Ayman al-
Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda deputy commander, issued an open invitation to answer 
questions posed to him through online forums. In char year, Muslim-on-
Muslim bloodshed in Iraq, Algeria, Pakistan and Afghanistan reached new 
heights. Al-Q1eda and its affiliates came under intense criticism by friends 
and foes alike for shedding the blood of believers. In response to these devel-
opments, the Sahab media outlet in coordination with rhe Fajr media centre 
announced Zawahiri's invitacion on 16 December. 1l1e questions, and Zawa-
hiri's reply to chem, appeared in two instalments on 2 and 22 April 2008. 
The first two questions presented by participants reAecred their rage at bla-
tant carelessness with which radical lslamists target their own people. A per-
son with a forum name of 'Geography Teacher' asked: 'Excuse me, Mr. 
Zawahiri, but who is killing the innocenr in Baghdad, Morocco and Algeria 
" Abu Basir al-Tartusi, 'Warnings Concerning Martyrdom or Suicide Operations,' (Arabic) 
posted on the Tnwhid waljihadwebsite (hn p://www.tawhcd.ws), 24 August 2005. 
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wich Your Excellency's blessing? Do you consider che killing of women and 
children jihad?' Anocher parcicipanc wich a forum name of 'Universicy Sm-
denc, Medicine, Algeria' asked: 'l wane al-Zawahiri co answer me abouc chose 
who kill che people in Algeria. What is the legal evidence for killing the 
innocenc?'15 
Jihadi Salafists have deployed a variecy of juscifications co legicimise suicide 
attacks in which Muslims are harmed. Some of these have relied on inscru-
mencal calculations based on rhe relative capabilities of jihadiscs vis-a-vis 
Western forces. Ochers have relied on emotional appeals char speak to the 
humiliation of Muslims ac che hands of arroganc powers and colluding gov-
ernmencs. Scill ochers rely on religious jusrificarions presumably rooted in 
classical rexes and rulings concerning jihad and marcyrdom. 1his paper has 
focused on the latter with emphasis on chree argumencs advanced by Jihadi 
Salafiscs: 1he meaning of piecy and aposcasy in Islam; rhe role of human 
incencionalicy in evaluating conduce; and specific rulings by medieval scholars 
concerning rhe appropriateness of indiscriminate tactics during warfare. 
1l1e principal argumenc for why Muslims can kill cheir co-religionists is 
based on the assumption char chose killed are merely nominal Muslims, not 
true believers, who have violaced cheir oach to Islam by caking infidels as allies 
againsc the believers. 1l1eir oucward conduce, regardless of ics underlying 
mocivacions, have placed these 'apostates' outside of the creed and, chus, 
beyond rhe procecrive umbrella of Islam. 
As for che act of self-sacrifice in a suicide bombing, here the extreme 
Salafisrs shift thei r focus away from the actual act of suicide and, instead, 
shine the spoclighr on the incencions of the bombers. As long as the bomber's 
intent is to fighc and die in the path of God as opposed to killing himself our 
of personal desperation and depression, he is a marcyr. Thus, Jihadi Salafiscs 
have reverted co an incerprerivisr methodology char contravenes their scricr 
conscruccionist predispositions chat would normally give primacy co clear and 
unequivocal Quranic verses and Prophecic traditions over human reasoning 
and rulings by fallible scholars. In the case of suicide bombings, rhe incencion 
of the bomber is more imporcanc chan his manifest deed. In che case of kill-
ing Muslims, rhe manifesc deed of chose being slaughcered is more imporranr 
rhan the intentions char motivare cheir oucward conduce. 
In sum, Jihadi Salafiscs' inreresc in justifying a deadly caccic has led chem 
co rely opporcu nisrically on ambiguous cradirions and rulings subject to scrin-
genr condirionalicy in order to circumvenc more clear and absoluce verses and 
JI Answers fo r Round One of questioning were rek':!Scd by the Al-Ikhlas Islamic Ncrwork 
(lmp://ek-ls.org/forum) on 2 April 2009. 
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prohibitions in Islam. Rather than approach historical rulings and traditions 
from the point of view of reconciling them with the clear verses and tradi-
tions that counsel against indiscriminateness and cruelty in warfare, they 
choose to ignore conrexr, conditionality and theories of jurisprudence to 
opportunistically frame suicide attacks as martyrdom in the path of God. 
Jihadi Salafists have shifted from strict constructionists interested in avoiding 
bid a (innovation) in theology to alchemists that conjure up selective argu-
ments, interpretive methodologies, and imaginative logics to venerate may-
hem against fellow Muslims. 
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